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ABSTRACT. 
We characterize the literacy of an individual in a domain by their elicited subjective belief
distribution over the possible responses to a question posed in that domain. We consider literacy
across several financial, economic and statistical domains. We find considerable demographic
heterogeneity in the degree of literacy. We also characterize the degree of consistency within a
sample about their knowledge, even when that knowledge is imperfect. We show how uncertainty
aversion might be a normatively attractive behavior for individuals who have imperfect literacy.
Finally, we discuss extensions of our approach to characterize financial capability, the consequences
of non-literacy, social literacy, and the information content of hypothetical survey measures of
literacy. 
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When we say that someone is literate we mean more than that they can just “read and write.”
The term more generally indicates someone who is educated, whether by formal or informal means,
and able to comprehend topics through words.1 Characterizing and measuring the literacy of an
individual requires then that we have some way of assessing how knowledgeable the person is about
certain topics. There are some topics about which one can have “crisp” knowledge, in the sense of
Boolean truth values. However, there are many domains of knowledge that one naturally expects
varying levels of precision. We characterize literacy in terms of the subjective beliefs that someone has
over possible responses to some question.
Following Savage [1971][1972], we define subjective beliefs by the choices that individuals make
when facing bets whose outcomes depend on those beliefs. The measurement of the literacy that
someone has in a specific domain entails the elicitation of their subjective beliefs. For that task we will
conduct an experiment using proper scoring rules, which are simply structured bets offered to the
individual by an observer (the experimenter). All of the elicited beliefs were incentivized and incentive-
compatible, so that the subjects were making real choices with real economic consequences.
Our approach is to elicit the entire subjective belief distribution that an individual has, to
ascertain how precise their knowledge is in response to some question. This generalizes the prevailing
approach to measuring literacy, which considers responses to (hypothetical) multiple choice questions
(e.g., Lusardi and Mitchell [2007][2008]). For a specific question or domain, we are able to say “how
literate” the person is, rather than just say that they are or are not literate. Of course, by asking a series
of questions one can ascertain the fraction of correct answers for an individual with the traditional
approach, but that requires one to pool responses over different questions which may span different
1 The Oxford English Dictionary (Second Edition) defines the adjective “literate” as someone who is
“acquainted with letters or literature; educated, instructed, learned.” Remund [2010] offers a balanced account
of the many definitions of literacy found in the academic and policy literature. Our focus on financial
knowledge corresponds to the first of his categories of conceptual definitions of literacy (p. 279).
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knowledge domains.
The domains of interest to us are financial, economic and statistical knowledge. We consider a
mixture of questions in which the correct answer involves the application of logical and grammatical
principles, and questions in which the correct answer involves some specific fact. This reflects a trend
in the measurement of literacy towards more than just the ability to draw logical or grammatical
conclusions from information presented in the question itself, and to also consider awareness of facts
that are of importance for the functioning of the individual.
A byproduct of our characterization is that we can also say something about the degree of
common knowledge that a sample of individuals have about some proposition. Quite apart from
whether or not a given individual knows the true answer with some precision, we often want to know
if a group of individuals have the same degree of knowledge. In effect, we are able to operationalize
several interpretations of what it means to have heterogeneous beliefs.
In section 1 we describe the experimental task we developed and employed with 120 subjects.
In section 2 we review in detail the properties of the subjective belief elicitation procedure. In section
3 we present results on the degree of financial and statistical literacy of our subjects. In section 4 we
consider the consistency of knowledge across subjects. Section 5 considers important extensions of
our approach, and section 6 concludes.
1. Procedures
A. Literacy
We consider literacy in terms of 8 specific questions asked of each subject in an experiment. In
each case there is a correct answer, and responses were elicited over a continuous range of possible
answers presented in terms of 10 intervals or “bins.” A computer interface was used to present the
belief elicitation tasks to subjects and record their choices, allowing them to allocate tokens in
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accordance with their subjective beliefs. Figure 1 presents the interface.2 The interface implements the
Quadratic Scoring Rule discussed in section 2. Subjects could move the sliders at the bottom of the
screen to re-allocate the 100 tokens as they wished, ending up with some distribution. The instructions
explained that they could earn up to £20, as shown in Figure 2, but only by allocating all 100 tokens to
one interval and that interval containing the true answer: if the true answer was just outside the
selected interval, they would in that case receive £0. At the time of the experiments in December
2012, £20 was worth roughly $32.
Subjects were rewarded for one of these 8 belief elicitation tasks, with the task selected at
random. The correct answer was revealed, and their earnings calculated according to the number of
tokens allocated to the true interval in their elicited beliefs. For example, if the respondent had
reported the beliefs in Figure 1, she would have been paid £16.25 if the correct answer was between
8% and 9.99%. As it happens, the correct answer here is 7.9%, so the subject would have actually
received £11.25 since the correct answer was in the next lower interval, corresponding to
unemployment rates between 6% and 7.99%.
The incentivized questions were as follows:
• Q1: Interest Compounding. “Suppose you had £100 in a savings account and the interest
rate is 2% per year and you never withdraw money or interest payments. After 5 years, how
much would you have on this account in total?” The correct answer is £110.40, and responses
were elicited between £105 and £115 in intervals of £1.
• Q2: Inflation. “Suppose you had £200 in a saving account. The interest rate on your saving
account was 1% per year and inflation was 2% per year. After 1 year, how much would be the
value of the money on this account?” The correct answer is £198, and responses were elicited
between £195 and £205 in intervals of £1.
• Q3: Expected Lifetime for Men. “Based on 2010 National Statistics, if a man lived to be 20
in the United Kingdom, how many more years would he expect to live? Note that this is not
the age he would die at, but how many more years he would expect to live.” The correct
answer is 59.1 years, and responses were elicited between 0 and 100 years in intervals of 10
2 The instructions are reproduced in full in Appendix A. The interface was initialized with 10 tokens
allocated to each bin.
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 years.3
• Q4: Expected Lifetime for Women. “Based on 2010 National Statistics, if a woman lived to
be 20 in the United Kingdom, how many more years would she expect to live? Note that this
is not the age she would die at, but how many more years she would expect to live.” The
correct answer is 62.9 years, and responses were elicited between 0 and 100 years in intervals
of 10 years.
• Q5: Breast Cancer Risk Presented in Probability Format. “The probability of breast
cancer is 1% for women at age 40 who participate in routine screening. If a woman has breast
cancer, the probability is 80% that she will get a positive mammography. If a woman does not
have breast cancer, the probability is 9.6% that she will also get a positive mammography. A
woman in this age group had a positive mammography in a routine screening. What is the
probability that she has breast cancer?” The correct answer is 7.8%, and responses were
elicited between 0% and 100% in intervals of 10%.
• Q6: Breast Cancer Risk Presented in Frequency Format. “10 out of every 1000 women at
age 40 who participate in routine screening have breast cancer. 8 of every 10 women with
breast cancer will get positive mammography. 95 out of every 990 women without breast
cancer will also get a positive mammography. In a new representative sample of 100 women at
age 40 who got a positive mammography in routine screening, how many of these women do
you expect to have breast cancer?” The correct answer is 7.8, and responses were elicited
between 0 and 100 in intervals of 10.
• Q7: Credit Solvency Risk Presented in Probability Format. “The probability of being
technically insolvent is 10% for homeowners who participate in a credit score test. If a
homeowner is insolvent, the probability is 90% that he will get a negative credit score. If a
homeowner is solvent, the probability is 5% that he will get a negative score. A homeowner
had a positive credit score in a routine test. What is the probability that he is insolvent?” The
correct answer is 66.6%, and responses were elicited between 0% and 100% in intervals of
10%.
• Q8: Credit Solvency Risk Presented in Frequency Format. “100 out of every 1000
homeowners who participate in routine credit score tests are technically insolvent. 90 of every
100 insolvent homeowners will get negative credit scores. 45 out of every 900 solvent
homeowners will also get a negative credit score. In a new representative sample of 100
homeowners who got a negative credit score in routine tests, how many of these homeowners
do you expect to be insolvent?” The correct answer is 67, and responses were elicited between
0 and 100 in intervals of 10.
The order of presentation of questions was randomized for each subject.
The first two questions are natural extensions of questions asked by Lusardi and Mitchell
3 At the time of the experiment we did not have access to the correct Life Tables, and instead
subtracted 20 from the expected lifetime at birth from the UK Office of National Statistics to pay subjects
that had this question selected. The difference for aggregates such as “all men” or “all women” is tiny, and did
not affect the payments to any subject given that the bin intervals we used were in 10-year increments: there is
a difference of 0.6 of a year for men (59.1 versus 58.5), and 0.5 of a year for women (62.9 versus 62.4).
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[2007][2008] in the Health & Retirement Survey (HRS) of 2004 in the United States.4 This survey is
naturally representative of Americans over the age of 50. Our Q1 adapts the following question of
theirs: “Suppose you had $100 in a savings account and the interest rate was 2 percent per year. After
5 years, how much do you think you would have in the account if you left the money to grow: more
than $102, exactly $102, less than $102?” The main difference is that we ask for beliefs about the true
answer over a wide range. Our Q2 adapts this question of theirs: “Imagine that the interest rate on
your savings account was 1 percent per year and inflation was 2 percent per year. After 1 year, would
you be able to buy more than, exactly the same as, or less than today with the money in this account?”
Lusardi and Mitchell [2012; Table 2.1] report that only 67.1% and 75.2% of their sample gave the
correct response to each question, respectively. These fractions drop significantly (their Figures 2.1a
and 2.1b) as one considers Black and Hispanic respondents. When the same questions were posed to a
nationally representative sample of young Americans, aged between 22 and 28 in Wave 11 of the
National Longitudinal Survey of Youth conducted in 2007-2008, 79.3% and 54.0% gave the correct
responses to the interest rate and inflation questions, respectively (Lusardi, Mitchell and Curto [2010;
Table 1, p. 365]).5
The next two questions ask about a basic informational input to retirement planning: expected
remaining lifetime, conditional on reaching the age of 20. Indeed, Smith, Taylor and Sloan [2001; p.
1126] call this “the most important subjective risk assessment a person can make,” although they were
referring to own-mortality. We separate out the question for men and women, to ascertain if the
4 A third question they asked was: Do you think that the following statement is true or false? “Buying a single
company stock usually provides a safer return than a stock mutual fund.” This question was posed in order to
understand if the individuals know how to diversify their investment. In a later Dutch national survey van
Rooij, Lusardi and Alessie [2011] increased the set of questions posed to individuals. Apart from 5 questions
aimed at characterizing “basic” financial literacy (p. 452), they added 11 questions to characterize “advanced”
financial literacy (p. 454). Similar extensions were undertaken by Bateman, Eckert, Geweke, Louviere, Thorp
and Satchell [2012] in surveys in Australia.
5 Bateman, Eckert, Geweke, Louviere, Thorp and Satchell [2012] ask these questions of adult
retirement savers in Australia, and find that 78.4% get the inflation question correct and 71.8% get the interest
rate question correct.
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differential expected mortality between the two is recognized by individuals. These questions do not
condition on the health, income, or any other relevant characteristics of the individual that would
affect expected mortality. One could easily extend these questions to elicit more precise beliefs about
someone who is more similar to the subject.
The most widely used subjective beliefs about longevity come from the Health and Retirement
Survey, which has asked a simple question since 1992 to respondents under the age of 65: “With 0
representing absolutely no chance, and 100 absolute certainty, what is the chance that you will live to
be 75 years of age or older?” A comparable question asks the chance that they would live to be 85, and
for respondents over 65 a variant asked the chances of them living 11-15 years more. In the 2006
wave of the Health and Retirement Survey a sub-sample was asked questions that elicited their beliefs
about the population life tables: “Out of a group of [men/women] your age, how many do you think
will survive to the age of X?” The value of X was 75 for those under 65 themself, and 11-15 years
older for those over 65. These questions are closer to those we asked, although we only conditioned
on the single age 20.
Of course, these questions are not incentivized, and do not elicit information on the
confidence of the subjective belief. However, Smith, Taylor and Sloan [2001] show that responses to
this question are reasonably good predictors of future, actual mortality, even if they do not perfectly
reflect new health information when updated. Perozek [2008] makes an even stronger case for the
predictive value of these subjective belief questions, arguing that responses to these questions actually
outperform population life tables. In contrast, Elder [2013] stresses that only with the 2006 wave can
one evaluate the actual predictions, as early respondents reach the target ages of 75 or 85. And in that
respect he presents a sharply contrary view, arguing that the evidence supports a “flatness bias,” a
“tendency for individuals to understate the likelihood of living to relatively young ages while
overstating the likelihood of loving to ages beyond 80.” He attributes this bias to a failure to recognize
-6-
that mortality risk increases with age.
The last four questions present Bayesian updating questions to evaluate that dimension of
statistical literacy. The first pair of questions on the risk of breast cancer are taken from the 15
questions considered by Gigerenzer and Hoffrage [1995; Table 2, p. 693]. Our Q5 and Q6 are direct
translations of the parameters they use for the same breast cancer risk question. The difference
between Q5 and Q6 is that the former uses conventional probability information to set up the
problem, and the latter uses natural frequencies to set up the same problem.6 Gigerenzer and Hoffrage
[1995; Figure 3, p. 694] report a dramatic improvement in the correct application of Bayes Rule as
their subjects moved from the probability format to the frequency format. For the breast cancer risk
example, the fraction increases from about 15% to about 40%. Over all of their 15 problems, the
fraction increased dramatically from 16% to 46%.
Our questions Q7 and Q8 consider another application of Bayes Rule reasoning, but with a
financial example having to do with the risk of consumer credit solvency. This issue is particularly
important in the United Kingdom, which had relatively high levels of consumer debt coming into the
global recession of 2008. It has also been an active area of policy debate, as illustrated by the Consumer
Credit and Personal Insolvency Review of the U.K. Treasury in November 2011.7
B. Demographics and Additional Measures
Apart from these incentivized subjective belief questions, which are our main focus, we asked
subjects several hypothetical questions that have been widely used in the literature on cognitive
abilities. One is Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT) proposed by Frederick [2005], consisting of three
6 We use what they refer to as the Standard Probability format and the Standard Frequency format.
They also considered shorter versions of each. We only report their results for the versions comparable to
ours.
7 See http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/fin_reform_consumer.htm. 
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questions:
• A bat and a ball cost £1.10 in total. The bat costs £1.00 more than the ball. How much does
the ball cost?
• If it takes 5 machines 5 minutes to make 5 widgets, how long would it take 100 machines to
make 100 widgets?
• In a lake, there is a patch of lily pads. Every day, the patch doubles in size. If it takes 48 days
for the patch to cover the entire lake, how long would it take for the patch to cover half of the
lake?
 
The correct answers are £0.05, 5 minutes and 47 days. Many subjects responding to these hypothetical
questions fail to “reflect” on some aspect of the information provided.8 The other hypothetical battery
is known as the Berlin Numeracy Test, and is due to Cokely, Galesic, Schulz, Ghazal and Garcia-
Retamero [2012]:
• Imagine we are throwing a five-sided die 50 times. On average, out of these 50 throws how
many times would this five-sided die show an odd number (1, 3 or 5)?
• Out of 1,000 people in a small town 500 are members of a choir. Out of these 500 members in
the choir 100 are men. Out of the 500 inhabitants that are not in the choir 300 are men. What
is the probability that a randomly drawn man is a member of the choir? (Please indicate the
probability in percentage).
• Imagine we are throwing a loaded die (6 sides) 70 times. The probability that the die shows a 6
is twice as high as the probability of each of the other numbers. On average, out of these 70
throws, how many times would the die show the number 6?
• In a forest 20% of mushrooms are red, 50% brown and 30% white. A red mushroom is
poisonous with a probability of 20%. A mushroom that is not red is poisonous with a
probability of 5%. What is the probability that a poisonous mushroom in the forest is red?
 
The correct answers are 30, 25%, 20 and 50%.
In addition, a standard list of demographic questions were posed. These included age, sex,
racial group, field of study, year of study, highest level of formal education expected to complete,
current grade, citizenship, marital status, number of people in household, total income of the
household, total income of parents, and smoking status.
8 It is an interesting question whether one should care if subjects get the CRT questions right when
they face incentives. In fact, many subjects do. But it could be argued that the CRT is designed to detect
cognitive propensities to spot “minimally hidden” information in decision settings, and that this propensity is
better detected when higher-order, executive brain functions are not engaged to earn money.
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C. Risk Attitudes
We were interested in measuring risk attitudes for two reasons. The first was to ensure that the
sample indeed was only modestly risk averse, as our priors from previous experiments would lead us
to expect. This is important for our ability to directly interpret responses to the questions as subjective
beliefs, as explained in the next section. The second reason was to measure the applicability of the
Reduction of Compound Lotteries (ROCL) axiom for our sample. We explain later the fundamental
importance of ROCL for the consequences of non-literacy, interpreted here as a non-degenerate
subjective belief distribution in some domain.
The battery of lotteries we use was designed by Harrison, Martínez-Correa and Swarthout
[2012] to allow for specific types of comparisons needed for testing ROCL over objective risk.
Beginning with a given simple (S) lottery and compound (C) lottery, we create an actuarially-equivalent (AE)
lottery from the C lottery, and then construct three pairs of lotteries: a S-C pair, a S-AE pair, and an
AE-C pair. By repeating this process 15 times, we create a battery of lotteries consisting of 15 S-C
pairs shown in Table A1, 15 S-AE pairs shown in Table A2, and 10 AE-C pairs9 shown in Table A3.
For transparency we used the universal “double or nothing” construction to generate compound
lotteries.
Subjects were presented the 40 lottery pairs in random order, and selected the preferred lottery
in each pair. Each lottery was displayed in a “pie chart” showing all probabilities and outcomes. All
random draws were undertaken physically with dice. Detailed instructions and screen displays are
provided in Appendix A.
9 The lottery battery contains only 10 AE-C lottery pairs because some of the 15 S-C lottery pairs
shared the same compound lottery.
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2. Belief Elicitation
The decision maker in our experiment reports her subjective beliefs with a discrete version of
a Quadratic Scoring Rule for continuous distributions, developed by Matheson and Winkler [1976].
Partition the domain into K intervals, and denote as r k the report of the density in interval k = 1, ÿ, K.
Assume for the moment that the decision maker is risk neutral, and that the full report consists of a
series of reports for each interval, { r1, r2, ÿ, r k ,ÿ, r K } such that r k $ 0 œk and ' i = 1ÿK (r i ) = 1.
If k is the interval in which the true value lies, then the payoff score is from Matheson and
Winkler [1976; p.1088, equation (6)]:
S = (2 × r k) - ' i = 1ÿK (r i )2 
The reward in the score is a doubling of the report allocated to the true interval, and a penalty that
depends on how these reports are distributed across the K intervals. The subject is rewarded for
accuracy, but if that accuracy misses the true interval the punishment is severe. The punishment
includes all possible reports, including the correct one.
Consider some examples, assuming K = 4. What if the subject has very tight subjective beliefs
and puts all of the tokens in the correct interval? Then the score is
S = (2 × 1) - (12 + 02 + 02 + 02 ) = 2 - 1 = 1,
and this is positive. But if the subject has a tight subjective belief that is wrong, the score is
S = (2 × 0) - (12 + 02 + 02 + 02 ) = 0 - 1 = -1,
and the score is negative. So we see that this score would have to include some additional
“endowment” to ensure that the earnings are positive.10 Assuming that the subject has a very diffuse
subjective belief and allocates 25% of the tokens to each interval, the score is less than 1:
S = (2 × ¼) - (¼2 + ¼2 + ¼2 + ¼2 ) = ½ - ¼ = ¼ < 1.
10 This is a point of practical behavioral significance, but is not important for the immediate
theoretical point.
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The tradeoff from the last case is that one can always ensure a score of ¼, but there is an incentive to
provide less diffuse reports, and that incentive is the possibility of a score of 1.
To ensure complete generality, and avoid any decision maker facing losses, allow some
endowment, α, and scaling of the score, β. We then get the generalized scoring rule
α + β [ (2 × r k) - ' i =1ÿK (r i ) 2 ]
where we initially assumed α=0 and β=1. We can assume different values of α and β to transform the
payoffs to any alternative range of  levels we may want.
In our experiment K = 10, and we do not know whether the subject is risk neutral. Indeed, the
weight of evidence from past experiments clearly suggests that subjects will be modestly risk averse
over the prizes they face. It is well-known that risk aversion can significantly affect inferences from
applications of the Quadratic Scoring Rule when eliciting subjective probabilities over binary events
(Winker and Murphy [1970], Kadane and Winkler [1988]), and there are various methods for
addressing these concerns.11 Harrison, Martínez-Correa, Swarthout and Ulm [2012] characterize the
implications of the general case of a risk averse agent when facing the QSR and reporting subjective
distributions over continuous events, and find, remarkably, that these concerns do not apply with anything
like the same force. For empirically plausible levels of risk aversion, one can reliably elicit the most
important features of the latent subjective belief distribution without undertaking calibration for risk
attitudes.
Specifically, they draw the following conclusions:
1. An individual reports having a positive probability for an event only if he has positive
subjective probability for the event. So if the individual believes that unemployment is
definitely below 12%, we would never see the individual reporting that it could be above 12%.
11 For instance, see Köszegi and Rabin [2008], Holt and Smith [2009], Karni [2009] and Andersen,
Fountain, Harrison and Rutström [2010].
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Further, we can infer from Figure 1, for instance, that this subject truly attaches zero weight to
the possibility of unemployment above 12%, no matter what his risk attitudes.
2. If an individual has the same subjective probability for two events, then the reported
probabilities for the two events will also be the same if the individual is risk averse or risk
neutral. So if the individual has a true, latent subjective probability of 0.1 that the
unemployment rate is between 6% and 7.99%, and a true, latent subjective probability of 0.1
that it is between 10% and 11.99%, then the reported probabilities for these two intervals will
be the same as well, as in Figure 1 (although typically not 0.1).
3. The converse is true for risk averse subjects, as well as for risk lovers. That is, if we observe
two events receiving the same reported probability, we know that the true probabilities are also
equal, although not necessarily the same as the reported probabilities.
4. If the individual has a symmetric subjective distribution, then the reported mean will be exactly
the same as the true subjective mean, whether or not the subjective distribution is unimodal.
Hence if we simply assume symmetry of the true distribution, a relatively weak assumption in
some settings, we can elicit the mean belief directly from the average of the reported
distribution.
5. The more risk averse an agent is, the more the reported distribution will resemble a uniform
distribution defined on the support of their true distribution. In effect, risk aversion causes the
individual to report a “flattened” version of their true distribution, but never to report beliefs
to which they assign zero subjective probability.
6. It is possible to derive the effect of increased risk aversion on the difference between the
reported distribution and true distribution. Harrison, Martínez-Correa, Swarthout and Ulm
[2012] show numerically that a priori plausible levels of risk aversion in laboratory settings
implies no significant deviation between reported and true subjective beliefs in this setting.
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Provided that our subjects exhibit the modest levels of risk aversion that are typically found in
lab settings with similar stakes, these results provide the basis for using the reported distributions as if
they are the true, subjective belief distributions.
3. Results on the Measurement of Literacy
A. Description of Results
In December 2012 we recruited 120 subjects from Durham University. The majority had
major fields of study in Finance or some other Business area, and were completing a Master of Science
degree. The average age was 24.4, 67% were women, and 85% were single and had never been
married. Just over 73% were non-EU citizens, and 14% were current smokers.
Figures 3 and 4 provide a quick helicopter tour of the aggregate beliefs we elicited. More
formal statistical tests will be provided below. We observe very precise beliefs for the interest
compounding question, which was relatively easy for our sample. Far less precision is observed for the
other domains. Aggregate beliefs for the economic literacy questions tended to be unimodal, with
most subjects having some sense of where the correct answer was, but with varying precision as we
will see. But when we come to the statistical literacy questions we see some interesting bimodal
aggregate beliefs. With a few exceptions, to anticipate, this bimodality comes from different
individuals: it is not the case that the same individual, in general, held such disparate views. The
suggestion, then, is that some subjects “got it,” and some subjects “had no clue.”12
Figures 5 and 6 begin the evaluation of individual responses for the two financial literacy
questions about interest compounding and inflation and the value of money. In each case we report
12 We are, of course, not the first to point out that incentivized subjects have problems applying
Bayes Rule. See Grether [1992] and Holt and Smith [2009] for careful results, and references to the larger
literature. El-Gamal and Grether [1995] go further and elegantly propose a finite mixture model to classify
subjects as exhibiting different models of updating.
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the correct answer, a “literacy index” and “concordance index,” the responses of three individuals
selected to illustrate some differences in individual behavior, and the pooled distribution. We discuss
the concordance index in the next section. 
We construct a simple index of literacy, L 0 [0, 1], given by the fraction of 100 tokens that the
individual allocates to the interval containing the true answer. This index does not need to be
estimated: it is a direct transformation of the observed data. Thus we see a value of L = 1 for subject
#1 in Figure 5, the interest compounding domain, since this subject allocated all 100 tokens to the
interval containing the correct answer. Many subjects did exactly the same thing in this case, but
subject #10 and subject #11 show how a few hedged their bets, quite literally. For subject #10, 60 of
the 100 tokens were in the interval containing the correct answer, so L = 0.60 for this subject.
In Figure 6 we see that subject #1 has a literacy index of zero, since she allocated all 100
tokens to the interval just to the left of the correct answer for the inflation question. In this domain,
subject #5 has a literacy index of 0.26 since 26 out of 100 tokens were allocated to the correct interval.
By being less dogmatic, subject #5 exhibited greater literacy than subject #1. Of course, one might
want to argue that subject #1 was very close to the correct answer, but countering that claim is the
subject’s choice, implicitly saying that she was certain of her answer. If indeed she has some
imprecision, that should have led her to report a non-degenerate distribution.
Figures 7 and 8 consider the other economic literacy questions, about expected remaining
lifetime for men and women. Figure 7 shows detailed responses for 11 individuals to the question
about men, since we observe considerable heterogeneity in this domain compared to the financial
literacy questions. The imprecision for subject #3, #5 and #7 is substantial, and leads one to speculate
if it shows up in their savings behavior or retirement planning. Figure 8 shows the differences in the
aggregate distribution between the questions about men and women, to gauge if aggregate literacy
detects the longer expected lifetime of women compared to men. Indeed, we see that this increment is
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detected.
Turning to the statistical risk questions in Figures 9 through 12, we uncover some dramatic
differences in individual literacy.
Consider the responses in the breast cancer risk domain, shown in Figures 9 and 10. Figure 9
displays 11 individual belief distributions, and Figure 10 then shows the pooled differences between
using the probability format for conveying information and the frequency format. There are many
subjects who exhibit considerable statistical literacy with this question: subjects #1, #3, #4 and #6 are
fully literate, and subjects #2, #10 and #11 exhibit just minor uncertainty. But subjects #5, #7, #8
and #9 illustrate a pattern that signifies an inability to process the information provided (or, to be sure,
an inability to understand how it translates into responses). 
Is this striking heterogeneity of statistical literacy improved by using a frequency format?
Figure 10 shows that it is, on balance. However, there remain a large number of individuals who
exhibit some beliefs that are statistically incorrect.
Turning finally to the credit risk domain, we see a similar pattern of heterogeneous literacy.
Several of the high-literacy subjects in the breast cancer domain also exhibited high levels of literacy in
this domain (e.g., #1, #3, #4, #6 and #10), and several of the low-literacy subjects did similarly in this
domain (e.g., #5, #7, #8 and #9). So the pattern that emerges from Figures 9 and 11 is of individuals
who are sharply divided between those who are highly-literate and those who have no clue about the
correct statistical inference. This is different from the uncertainty that each individual generally had
with respect to the question about the remaining lifetimes of men and women. In contrast to the
finding for breast cancer risk, Figure 12 also suggests that there was no improvement in statistical
literacy in the credit risk domain as we moved from using probability information to frequency
information in the statement of the question.  
Finally, Figures 13 and 14 collate information on the distribution of the literacy indices L
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across the domains considered. The vertical, dashed line is the average of each distribution, for
reference. The distribution for the interest compounding question, in the top left panel of Figure 13, is
what one would normatively like to see: almost universal high-literacy. However, one can visually infer
that this is the exception across these economic and statistical domains. The distributions for statistical
literacy might seem inconsistent with the displays of pooled beliefs, which show the largest mode at
the correct response. If this is the case, how can the largest mode for the literacy index be at zero? The
answer is that the subjects who understood how to draw statistical inferences tended to do so with
certainty, allocating all 100 tokens to the correct interval, and the subjects who did not understand
how to respond allocated tokens all over the possible range. There is one way to be completely correct
about these questions, and 4,263,421,511,270 ways to be wrong.13
B. Statistical Analysis of Results
Before the beliefs data are analyzed, we must assess whether the risk attitudes of individuals
are within the limit that leads to no significant incentive for subjects to distort their true beliefs.
Applying maximum likelihood methods described by Harrison and Rutström [2008] to the lottery
choice data pooled over all individuals, we estimate a relative risk aversion of 0.74 with a 95%
confidence interval between 0.69 and 0.78. These estimates are well within the tolerance that Harrison,
Martínez-Correa, Swarthout and Ulm [2012] suggest (only values as high as 2 or 3 start to cause
problems of interpretation). We also estimate relative risk aversion values for each individual, and the
distribution of these estimates is also well within the range that is required.14 
13 If there are t tokens and b bins, then there are (t+b-1)!/t!(b-1)! possible allocations in each of our
elicitation tasks. Only one of these is completely correct. If someone has a literacy index L = 0 then there are
still (100+9-1)!/100!(9-1)! = 352,025,629,371 ways to respond.
14 Figure B1 in Appendix B displays this distribution. Numerically reliable estimates are obtained for
114 of 120 subjects.
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A natural statistical model for directly evaluating the beliefs data is interval regression. In this
specification the dependent variable refers to the intervals given by our elicitation “bins.”15 In all cases
we control for sex, age, marital status, race, whether a Finance major, whether a non-EU citizen,
whether a current smoker, and the scores on the CRT and Berlin Numeracy Test. The age and test
scores are all normalized to have mean zero and unit standard deviation. Detailed estimates are
provided in Appendix B.
The interval regression models for each belief question16 show the following statistically
significant demographic effects:
• Older individuals are slightly more literate in the interest compounding domain, although there
is very little variation in the dependent variable here (Figure 5).
• Women have slightly lower literacy in the inflation domain.
• Whites are much more literate on the expected remaining life years for men (and also for
women, although the effect for women is not statistically significant).
• Older individuals are substantially more literate on the expected remaining life years for
women.
•  Finance majors and those scoring well on the Berlin Numeracy Test were much more literate
on the breast cancer risk question when presented in probability format, but whites and
current smokers are clearly identifiable as those that did not “get it.”
• The effects of demographics for the breast cancer risk question when presented in frequency
15 Interval regression allows one to identify clopen intervals with -4 as a lower bound or +4 as an
upper bound, but that is not generally appropriate for our elicitation tasks. We evaluate the effects of using
such clopen bounds for the interest compounding and inflation questions, and it makes no difference to our
conclusions.
16 For the breast cancer risk and credit risk questions we only consider estimates for the sample that
got each indicated format as the first question (Tables B7 and B8). There appears to be a rich demographic
interaction with these order effects of the format, as suggested by the contrasting estimates for the same
characteristic in Tables B5 and B7, and in Tables B6 and B8.
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format were in the same direction as with the probability format, but none were statistically
significantly different from zero.
• Single, older individuals and those who scored well on the Berlin Numeracy Test were more
literate on the credit risk question in probability format.
• Only older individuals were more literate on the credit risk question in the frequency format.
We evaluate the systematic effect of demographics more formally below by pooling across measures
of literacy L in different domains.
The interval regression model for the two questions on breast cancer risk,17 confirms the
inferences drawn from Figure 10. Using the frequency format to present the basic information needed
to apply Bayes Rule improves literacy by moving average responses closer to the true value by 8.8
percentage points, and the estimate of this effect has a p-value of 0.001. Being a Finance major also
improves literacy in this domain, by 8.8 percentage points (p-value of 0.078). And the Berlin Numeracy
Test score is also correlated with a significant improvement in statistical literacy of 7.2 percentage
points (p-value of 0.012). The CRT score has no statistically significant effect on responses.
Reductions in literacy are associated with being White (14.5 percentage points, and a p-value of 0.010)
and a current smoker (16.6 percentage points, and a p-value of 0.018).18
However, when applied to the credit risk responses, we see no effect from using the frequency
format.19 Average beliefs are actually lowered by the frequency format, away from the true posterior
probability, by 1.1 percentage points, but this effect is not statistically significantly different from zero
(p-value of 0.66). The Berlin Numeracy Test score again is associated with an improvement in literacy
in this statistical task: responses increase with 4.6 percentage points (p-value of 0.03). And being single
17 Table B13.
18 The same qualitative results are obtained if we restrict the sample to those who were presented the
frequency format as the second question (Tables B14). 
19 Table B15.
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is associated with a better literacy in this domain (by 15.1 percentage points, with a p-value of 0.025).
Finally, women exhibit significantly poorer literacy in this domain (by 9.9 percentage points, with a p-
value of 0.02).20
To assess the effects of demographics on literacy we estimate an ordered logit model of the
literacy index L, but collapse the index to three values for ease of interpretation. One value
corresponds to 0 # L # a and might be called “illiterate,” another value corresponds to a # L # b
and might be called “semi-literate,” and a final value corresponds to L > b and might be called
“literate.” Table 1 reports the marginal effects21 of the listed covariates on the probability of being
illiterate, semi-literate and literate, as defined here.
These effects are normalized to the high literacy found in the interest compounding question,
so it is not surprising to see most of the dummies for individual questions showing an increased effect
on the probability of illiteracy by comparison. For instance, compared to the interest compounding
question, the effect of asking the inflation question was to increase the probability of illiteracy (L # a)
by 0.39. We observe a large, positive, statistically significant effect of +0.11 on the probability of being
literate (L > b) from asking the breast risk question with the frequency format, but a small, negative,
statistically significant effect of -0.05 from asking the credit risk question with the frequency format.
Focusing only on statistically significant effects, in this sample women are more likely to be
illiterate and less likely to be literate than men. Older subjects are more likely to be semi-literate and
literate. Marriage is associated with a striking increase in illiteracy. Being a Finance major is associated
with heightened literacy. Being a non-EU citizen is associated with a much lower level of literacy
20 The same qualitative results are obtained if we restrict the sample to those who were presented the
frequency format as the second question (Tables B16). 
21 These are the average marginal effects, evaluated by considering all of the actual values of the non-
target variables and averaging the marginal effects across those values. The alternative is to consider the
average values of the non-target variables and reporting the marginal effect at that single set of values.
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compared to EU citizens. Finally, the Berlin Numeracy Test is associated with a significantly higher
probability of being literate. These demographic effects are a mix of the expected (e.g., the Berlin
Numeracy Test) and the unexpected (e.g., being single). The significance of these demographic effects
also points to the heterogeneity of literacy across these domains.
4. Results on the Consistency of Knowledge
Although literacy is a capacity that is naturally measured for the individual, it obviously impacts
the extent to which knowledge about something is shared. We consider the idea of social literacy later,
but if someone has a poor level of literacy in some domain, the natural question is whether that is
consistent with the knowledge that others have. The immediate consequences for behavior when there
are heterogeneous beliefs are by now well-studied, such as in models of asset pricing in finance (e.g.,
Shefrin [2008]), game theoretical interaction, and rational expectations.
These ideas are also familiar from linguistics. The process of learning a language involves the
disambiguation of utterances (Allen [1995]). And many linguists discuss language use as intentionally
constrained by norms of communicating understanding, which is to say greater literacy (Grice [1989],
Clark [1992]). Hence one naturally seeks some measure of shared literacy. Is the uncertainty over some
fact in a given domain shared, or is it a domain in which one can clearly identify “experts” and
“novices?” We propose a simple measure that can allow us to address that question.
Any measuring instrument can be compared against another measuring instrument. Examples
include weight scales, political opinion polls, or medical judgements about diagnoses. In our case we
consider the subjective beliefs about some fact, and seek to measure their consistency. In the
biostatistics literature a popular concordance index ρc has been developed by Lin [1989][2000]. It
combines the familiar notion of correlation from a Pearson inter-class correlation coefficient with
allowance for bias, and is virtually identical to measures of intra-class correlation (Nickerson [1997]). It
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is bounded between ±1, with the usual interpretation that ρc = 1 indicates perfect concordance, and
smaller values indicate poorer concordance. 
In Figure 5, for instance, we evaluate the concordance index for each subject with respect to
the pooled belief distribution on the interest compounding question, and then also report the average
value of the index over all 120 subjects. Even though subject #1 in that setting had a literacy index
value of 1, since she gave the correct responses, her concordance with the group was slightly less than
1 (0.972) because some people in the group did not have perfect literacy in this domain (e.g., subjects
#10 and #11, shown in Figure 5). Taking a less extreme case, such as the inflation and value of money
question in Figure 6, we see much lower levels of concordance. Subject #5, even though less precise
than subject #1 and subject #3, was more consistent with the beliefs that everyone else had.
Moving to the distribution of concordance indices in each domain, Figures 15 and 16 show the
heterogeneity of beliefs we elicited. The interest compounding question, in Figure 15, is again an
outlier, showing considerable literacy in this sample (from Figure 13) and hence considerable
consistency.
5. Limitations and Extensions
A. Capability
The modern policy literature on literacy stresses the concept of “capability,” which is the
extent to which individuals use their knowledge, as distinct from being able to answer abstract
questions successfully. The concept of capability seeks to characterize if someone is able to function in
a certain domain. This raises many subtle, interesting issues.
It is not obvious that someone must know the right answer in order to be able to function in
some domain robustly. There are some task domains where the payoffs are very “flat,” in the sense
that large errors in the specific choice lead to virtually the same expected payoff as more refined
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choices. These are well known in experimental economics (Harrison [1989][1992][1994]).
It is also not obvious that someone must infer the right answer by applying grammatical or
logical algorithms in order to make good choices: heuristics might do very well in many domains,
whether or not there is a flat payoff at work in the region of choice. This is a major theme of the work
of Gigerenzer [1996], and runs counter to the presumption that many draw from Kahneman and
Tversky [1996] that heuristics generally lead to sub-optimal choices.
The concept of capability also raises the issue of domain-specific knowledge, which goes
beyond the “reasoning from first principles and the information in front of you” approach that
characterizes most analyses of literacy. Someone might be a wizard at applying Bayes Rule, but simply
have an incorrect prior belief about some base rate. Such a person would typically be deemed
statistically literate but not capable.
The notion of capability can be directly evaluated by adding tasks that apply some of the
knowledge about which someone is supposed to exhibit literacy. A good illustration in the context of
hypothetical survey evidence on inflation expectations is provided by Armentier, de Bruin, Topa, van
der Klaauw and Zafar [2011], who pose an investment task to subjects that depends, in part, on their
expectations of inflation. Do people act on their expectations and literacy? Our incentivized elicitation
procedures build in a check for that, of course, since the subjective beliefs are revealed to us through
structured bets that involve real stakes. But the question is whether or not the knowledge
demonstrated in one literacy task is correctly applied in related contexts. For instance, does the degree
of literacy that our subjects exhibit in Q2 on the distinction between nominal and real values affect
their propensity to suffer from a “money illusion” in an experiment of the kind reported by Fehr and
Tyran [2001]?
More generally, the concept of financial literacy is not just the same as financial knowledge,
although the latter is obviously an important component of the former. Remund [2010] reviews the
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many definitions of financial literacy found in the academic and policy literature, and correctly notes
that operational measures need not entail knowledge. For instance, someone might hire an expert to
complete their taxes or design their retirement portfolio, and not know anything about tax rules or
retirement planning. Of course, one might say that this reflects “embodied” or “social” knowledge,
rather than individual knowledge, but that in itself is an important distinction we return to below.
Huston [2010] conducts a meta-analysis of research into financial literacy, and noted that 47%
of the 71 studies evaluated used the terms financial literacy and financial knowledge synonymously.
Indeed, if one just looks at the 62% of studies that referred to both, over 75% used them
interchangeably. She correctly concluded that “If these two constructs are conceptually different, then
using the terms interchangeably indicates a potential problem” (p. 303).
B. The Consequences of Non-Literacy
If someone exhibits a low degree of literacy in some domain, does it follow that he will act on
his beliefs in the same manner as someone who exhibits a higher degree of literacy? In other words, if
one person knows that he does not have precise knowledge in a certain domain, does he act on that
knowledge of his relative literacy? This question goes to the heart of distinctions between risk,
uncertainty and ambiguity. 
If somebody has a well-defined subjective belief distribution about some matter, Subjective
Expected Utility (SEU) assumes that they act as if they reduce that distribution down to it’s weighted
mean, and then make a decision as if that weighted mean probability was known with certainty. To
illustrate, assume a three-point discrete, non-degenerate, subjective distribution over a binary event in
which the individual holds subjective probability π = 0.6 with “prior” probability 0.1, π = 0.7 with
“prior” probability 0.6, and π = 0.8 with “prior” probability 0.3, for a weighted average π = 0.72. Now
consider a lottery in which one gets $X if the event occurs, and $x otherwise. Then the SEU is
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0.1×0.6×U(X)+0.1×0.4×U(x)+0.6×0.7×U(X)+0.6×0.3×U(x)+0.3×0.8×U(X)+0.3×0.2×U(x),
which collapses to 
(0.1×0.6 + 0.6×0.7 + 0.3×0.8) × U(X) + (0.1×0.4 + 0.6×0.3 + 0.3×0.2) × U(x),
and hence to
0.72 × U(X) + 0.28 × U(x)
under the ROCL axiom. So the original non-degenerate distribution can be reduce down to a
degenerate subjective probability of 0.72 under ROCL: an impressive identifying restriction.
Now return to our question about the differential behavior of someone who is less literate in
some domain, and knows it. Being “less literate” does not mean that one has zero mean errors on
either side of the true value. Hence it is far from obvious that there is any normative appeal to
applying ROCL in this setting. Indeed, common sense indicates that the decision-maker, armed with
knowledge of his lack of literacy, should somehow take that lack of precision in beliefs into account.
In other words, the decision maker should, in some manner, violate ROCL.
Figure 17 provides some insight into the practical significance of this point. By replacing the
subjective belief distributions generated by each of our subjects on each of the 8 questions with their
weighted mean and then recalculating the literacy index L with this SEU-consistent probability, we see
the effect of being SEU-consistent on literacy. Of course, one corollary is that this SEU-consistent
measure of literacy is binary: one either has a weighted mean in the true interval or not. Averaging
over all 120 individuals, this SEU-consistent literacy index is generally lower than the raw literacy
index L. It is not dramatically lower for the statistical questions, or the interest compounding question
that virtually every subject answered correctly. But for some domains, such as understanding the
effects of inflation and knowing expected remaining lifetime, the implications of applying SEU are a
dramatic reduction in apparent literacy. For a few individuals, the application of ROCL increases the
literacy index L for some domains; this occurs when their weighted mean was correct, but they had
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assigned some subjective belief to other values.
How we relax ROCL is a matter for important, foundational research. Although it has taken
half a century for the implications of Ellsberg [1961] to be formalized in tractable ways, we are much
closer to doing so. One popular approach is the “smooth ambiguity model” of Klibanoff, Marinacci
and Mukerji [2005], although there are many other competing specifications in the literature.
To provide a concrete example, we illustrate the smooth ambiguity model with some simple
numbers. Let CE(π=0.6) be the certainty equivalent of the lottery 0.6×U(X)+0.4×U(x), CE(π=0.7) be
the certainty equivalent of the lottery 0.7×U(X)+0.3×U(x), and CE(π=0.8) be the certainty equivalent
of the lottery 0.8×U(X)+0.2×U(x). Using the priors from our previous example,  the evaluation of the
lottery is
0.1×φ(U(CE(π=0.6))) + 0.6×φ(U(CE(π=0.7))) + 0.3×φ(U(CE(π=0.8))),
where φ is a function defined over the domain of U(.). Akin to the properties of U(@) defining risk
attitudes under SEU, the properties of φ(@) define attitudes towards the uncertainty over the particular
subjective probability value.22 If φ is concave, then the decision-maker is uncertainty averse; if φ is
convex, then the decision-maker is uncertainty loving; and if φ is linear, then the decision-maker is
uncertainty neutral. The familiar SEU specification emerges if φ is linear, since then ROCL applies
after some irrelevant normalization. The overall evaluation of the lottery depends on risk attitudes and
uncertainty attitudes, and there is no reason for the decision-maker to be averse to both at the same
time.
We can now restate our initial question yet again: is someone who exhibits less literacy in some
domain also likely to exhibit violations of ROCL in that domain? Although we generally want to avoid
22 In the original specifications φ is said to characterize attitudes towards ambiguity, but the earlier
definition of risk, uncertainty and ambiguity makes it apparent why one would not want to casually confound
the two. One would only be dealing with ambiguity in the absence of well-defined prior probabilities over the
three subjective probability values 0.6, 0.7 and 0.8.
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the expression “illiteracy” in lieu of “degree of literacy,” this restatement is in effect equating “illiteracy
aversion” with “uncertainty aversion” or “ambiguity aversion.”
We are a long way from being able to rigorously test if someone behaves consistently with
ROCL defined over subjective belief distributions.23 But it is relatively straightforward to gather
evidence on a closely related hypothesis concerning the violations of ROCL defined over objective risk,
which was the secondary purpose of our lottery choice tasks. Figure 18 shows a distribution of p-
values of hypothesis tests of ROCL for each individual. This test is constructed by assuming that the
individual has a different risk attitude for simple lotteries and compound lotteries, estimating those
two risk attitudes using maximum likelihood methods, and then testing for the equality of those two
risk attitudes.24 Those in the mode to the left of Figure 18 are classified as violating ROCL, and those
to the right of that mode are classified as behaving consistently with ROCL. We stress, again, that
these p-values test ROCL over objective probabilities, not subjective beliefs.
Figure 19 then collects the information in Figure 17 and Figure 18 for each individual. The left
panel of Figure 19 shows the relationship between the literacy index L for each individual, averaged
over all 8 domains, and their p-value on the test of ROCL. Normatively, one would have hoped to see
23 Indeed, the identification problems run deeper. It is tempting to argue that the elicited subjective
distributions reveal what Ghirardato, Maccheroni and Marinacci [2004] refer to as “revealed ambiguity,”
which is the set of priors that a person has about some events. This allows us, following them, to separate the
individual’s perceived ambiguity from that individual’s reaction to it: for instance, if ROCL is applied, as we
just argued, then the individual is ambiguity-neutral. But then we have to recognize that any given stimulus or
domain might be ambiguous to one person and not ambiguous to another person. This is anticipated clearly
by Ghirardato, Maccheroni and Marinacci [2004; p. 136] who note that “... nothing precludes two DMs from
perceiving different ambiguity in the same decision problem.” The implication of this insight is that
experimental economists cannot just confront subjects with a task, such as the Ellsberg two-urn task, and
assume that every subject perceives it as ambiguous. The fact that such tasks are conventionally labeled as
“ambiguous” in the literature does not make them so in the minds of subjects. One non-ambiguous
interpretation in this case is that the experimenter picked the fraction of red and black balls in the
“ambiguous” urn using a uniform distribution over all outcomes. This interpretation removes all ambiguity,
and reduces the problem to a compound lottery over objective risk (which could still be evaluated with or
without the help of ROCL).
24 This is the “source-dependent” model of Harrison, Martínez-Correa and Swarthout [2012].
Estimation was undertaken at the level of the individual. Out of 120 subjects, 6 did not numerically converge
and are dropped from this analysis.
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a tendency for individuals to violate ROCL, since applying ROCL tends, from Figure 17, to increase
overall literacy. If anything we see a slight tendency for a positive relationship: a descriptive Tobit
regression of the literacy index L on the p-values testing ROCL has a coefficient of +0.12 with a p-
value itself of only 0.072. So there is a very slight tendency for those with higher literacy indices to
behave as if they are ROCL-consistent over objective lotteries. The right panel of Figure 19 examines
this issue in a more direct manner, by looking at the relationship between the reduction in literacy for an
individual from applying ROCL and their p-value on the test of ROCL. Here we would have
normatively hoped for those with big reductions in literacy from applying ROCL, big positive values
in this scatter plot, to be the ones for whom ROCL was rejected. This would imply a negative
relationship in this panel of Figure 19, and clearly there is none.25 Again, our measure of ROCL is over
objective lotteries, and one can imagine a pun-loving subject saying, “I don’t have a problem with
compound objective lotteries, or even with easy compounding questions, but I will certainly be careful
applying ROCL in domains like statistical inference or harder economic choices such as my remaining
lifetime.”
Taken together, Figures 17, 18 and 19 show the significance of understanding the relationship
between literacy and ROCL, if one is to understand the consequences of non-literacy for choice. In
the spirit of the “second best,” it is not at all obvious that obeying ROCL is normatively attractive if
one has subjective beliefs that are not, on average, correct.
C. Social Literacy
When measuring the literacy of a household, how does one account for the heterogeneity of
levels of literacy within the household? The concept of effective literacy, developed by Basu and
25 A descriptive regression of the reduction in the literacy index L on the p-values testing ROCL has a
coefficient of 0.042 with a p-value of 0.30.
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Foster [1998], considers this important dimension of what might also be called “social literacy.”
Obviously the measurement issues goes beyond the household, and includes any social network used
by individuals for making decisions.
One approach focuses on potential literacy, and defines literacy in terms of the most literate
person in the household. This adjustment to naïve measures of literacy at the individual level is easy to
make, and provides a valuable upper bound. One could, of course, similarly define a lower bound if
the household power relationships lead to the least literate person imposing his or her will on the
household decision in some setting. In general, social literacy is a public good, and might be subject to
varying “composition functions” in the sense of Harrison and Hirshliefer [1989]. The upper and lower
bounds just noted reflect “best shot” and “weakest link” composition functions, but of course there
could be a wide range of (less extreme) functions, and they could vary from domain to domain. Using
our tools for characterizing the production function for social literacy in these settings is an important
extension.
D. Hypothetical Surveys and the Measurement of Literacy
Most surveys of literacy are hypothetical, in the sense that they do not pose incentivized
questions as we do. An obvious question is whether this leads to any bias in responses, with the
presumption to economists that having incentives will provide more reliable responses.26 In fact, there
are two components of these hypothetical questions: one is the lack of any financial or economic
26 Delavande, Giné and McKenzie [2011; p. 156] make the case for not bothering about incentives.
Referring to studies in developing countries that have all been hypothetical, they argue that “even without
payment, the answers received from such questions appear reasonable, and as such, there seems to have been
a de facto decision that payments are not needed.” We do not know what “reasonable” might possibly mean
when it comes to subjective beliefs. In some settings, such as stated beliefs about longevity (e.g., Perozek
[2008]), the metric for reasonableness appears to be whether the beliefs are actuarially correct on average.
Although that is certainly of great policy interest, it is hard to know why it would be a metric for evaluating
the validity of responses as reflecting the true subjective beliefs of individuals.
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consequence to giving one answer rather than another, and the other is whether or not incentives
actually encourage truthfulness. It is easy to come up with scoring rules or prediction markets, for
instance, that do not elicit responses that can be meaningfully interpreted even if there are financial
rewards involved (e.g., Manski [2006] and Fountain and Harrison [2011]).
We expect there to be some correlation between well-constructed, popular, hypothetical
surveys of literacy and our measures, in the sense that the former are likely to be statistically
informative about the latter. Indeed, we envisage a complementarity between the two. Large samples
can be collected using hypothetical surveys, and then calibrated using results from incentivized
responses to the same questions from a smaller sub-sample drawn from the same population (e.g.,
Blackburn, Harrison and Rutström [1994]).
E. Measuring Literacy Without Assuming Literacy
An important and obvious question is how to design measures of literacy that do not presume
certain kinds of literacy. This question becomes critical when one recognizes that informal knowledge
can of course be held without the ability to formally communicate it by reading, particularly if the text
involves jargon of some kind, such as probabilistic statements. An excellent example of the type of
modifications that can be made to elicit responses is provided by Delevande and Kohler [2012; Online
Supplement], who elicited hypothetical subjective belief distributions from individuals in Malawi.
Although they did not use any scoring rule at all, their language explained the mechanism in simple
terms:
I will ask you several questions about the chance or likelihood that certain events are
going to happen. There are 10 beans in the cup. I would like you to choose some
beans out of these 10 beans and put them in the plate to express what you think the
likelihood or chance is of a specific event happening. One bean represents one chance
out of 10. If you do not put any beans in the plate, it means you are sure that the event
will NOT happen. As you add beans, it means that you think the likelihood that the
event happens increases. For example, if you put one or two beans, it means you think
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the event is not likely to happen but it is still possible. If you pick five beans, it means
that it is just as likely it happens as it does not happen (fifty-fifty). If you pick six beans,
it means the event is slightly more likely to happen than not to happen. If you put ten
beans in the plate, it means you are sure the event will happen. There is no right or
wrong answer, I just want to know what you think. Let me give you an example.
Imagine that we are playing Bawo [a local board game with objective probabilities].
Say, when asked about the chance that you will win, you put seven beans in the plate.
This means that you believe you would win seven out of ten games on average if we
play for a long time.
Our approach, following Andersen, Fountain, Harrison and Rutström [2010], is to use visual,
computerized interfaces that embody formal scoring rules “underneath the hood.” These interfaces
only present individuals with the implied lotteries from using those rules, and do not need to confront
subjects with complicated payoff tables of numbers. We recognize the current limitations of these
approaches for many populations of interest in the measurement of literacy.
6. Conclusions
Literacy is a concept that is widely discussed, and clearly at the core of understanding
economic behavior in modern societies. We propose a characterization of literacy using the familiar
notion of a subjective belief distribution over questions in a certain domain. We demonstrate how
these belief distributions can be elicited in an operational, incentive-compatible manner. We show that
there is considerable heterogeneity in literacy levels over economic, financial and statistical domains,
and across observable demographics. We also demonstrate that uncertainty aversion might be
normatively attractive to those with imperfect literacy.
The immediate extensions of our approach are to consider broader samples and other domains
of literacy, as well as the effects of controlled interventions on the distribution of literacy. Evaluation
of the consequences of imperfect illiteracy can be undertaken by studying the choices made, or
avoided, in related tasks that rely on literacy in that domain. Do semi-literate individuals avoid welfare-
improving choice domains for fear that they might make serious mistakes? Relatively straightforward
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extensions to consider social literacy are also important and natural using our characterization. More
challenging is the evaluation of the extent to which individuals apply ROCL over subjective belief
distributions, and hence whether uncertainty aversion is normatively appealing. 
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Figure 1: Belief Elicitation Interface






































Labels in left (right) panel show lower bound (midpoint) of elicited interval
Figure 3: Pooled Subjective Beliefs









































Labels show midpoint of elicited interval
Figure 4: Pooled Subjective Beliefs
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Average Literacy index L = 0.81 and average Concordance index c = 0.879
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Figure 5: Subjective Beliefs of Three Subjects
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All 120 subjects
Correct Answer is £198
Average Literacy index L = 0.38 and average Concordance index c = 0.434
Labels show lower bound: e.g., £195 refers to the interval £195 to £195.99
Figure 6: Subjective Beliefs of Three Subjects
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Correct answer is 59.1 years for men and 62.9 years for women
Average Literacy index L = .34 for men and .29 for women
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Average Literacy index L = 0.37 and average Concordance index c = 0.305
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Average Literacy index L = .37 for Probability Format and .48 for Frequency Format
Figure 10: Elicited Beliefs For Breast Cancer Risk
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Correct posterior probability is 67%
Average Literacy index L = .34 for Probability Format and .29 for Frequency Format
Figure 12: Elicited Beliefs For Credit Score Risk
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Figure 14: Literacy Indices for Statistical Questions
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Table 1: Ordered Logit Model of Literacy Index
Variable Estimate Standard Error p-value 95% Confidence
Interval
A. Effect on Probability of Being Illiterate
Inflation  0.39 0.009 0.000  0.37  :   0.40
Lifetime of men  0.41 0.008 0.000  0.39  :   0.42
Lifetime of women  0.43 0.008 0.000  0.41  :   0.44
Breast cancer, probability  0.36 0.008 0.000  0.35  :   0.38
Breast cancer, frequency -0.13 0.016 0.000 -0.16  :  -0.10
Credit risk, probability  0.45 0.009 0.000  0.43  :   0.47
Credit risk, frequency  0.06 0.018 0.001  0.03  :   0.09
Female  0.07 0.011 0.000  0.04  :   0.09
Age, standardized -0.05 0.007 0.000 -0.07  :  -0.04
Single -0.15 0.018 0.000 -0.18  :  -0.11
White  0.03 0.015 0.074 -0.00  :   0.06
Finance major -0.06 0.010 0.000 -0.08  :  -0.04
Non-EU citizen  0.10 0.016 0.000  0.07  :   0.13
Current smoker  0.02 0.013 0.241 -0.01  :   0.04
Cognitive reflection test -0.01 0.005 0.152 -0.02  :   0.00
Berlin numeracy test -0.10 0.005 0.000 -0.11  :  -0.09
B. Effect on Probability of Being Semi-Literate
Inflation -0.11 0.004 0.000 -0.12  :  -0.10
Lifetime of men -0.12 0.004 0.000 -0.12  :  -0.11
Lifetime of women -0.12 0.004 0.000 -0.13  :  -0.12
Breast cancer, probability -0.07 0.002 0.000 -0.07  :  -0.06
Breast cancer, frequency  0.02 0.002 0.000  0.02  :   0.02
Credit risk, probability -0.10 0.003 0.000 -0.11  :  -0.09
Credit risk, frequency -0.01 0.005 0.002 -0.02  :  -0.05
Female -0.01 0.002 0.000 -0.02  :  -0.01
Age, standardized   0.01 0.001 0.000  0.01  :   0.01
Single  0.04 0.006 0.000  0.03  :   0.05
White -0.01 0.003 0.080 -0.01  :   0.00
Finance major  0.01 0.002 0.000  0.01  :   0.02
Non-EU citizen -0.02 0.002 0.000 -0.02  :  -0.01
Current smoker -0.00 0.003 0.256 -0.01  :   0.00
Cognitive reflection test  0.00 0.001 0.153 -0.00  :   0.00
Berlin numeracy test  0.02 0.001 0.000  0.02  :   0.02
C. Effect on Probability of Being Literate
Inflation -0.23 0.006 0.000 -0.29  :  -0.27
Lifetime of men -0.29 0.006 0.000 -0.30  :  -0.28
Lifetime of women -0.30 0.006 0.000 -0.31  :  -0.29
Breast cancer, probability -0.30 0.007 0.000 -0.31  :  -0.28
Breast cancer, frequency  0.11 0.015 0.000  0.08  :   0.14
Credit risk, probability -0.35 0.007 0.000 -0.37  :  -0.34
Credit risk, frequency -0.05 0.013 0.000 -0.07  :  -0.02
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Female -0.05 0.009 0.000 -0.07  :  -0.04
Age, standardized   0.04 0.005 0.000  0.03  :   0.05
Single  0.11 0.013 0.000  0.08  :   0.13
White -0.02 0.012 0.073 -0.04  :   0.00
Finance major  0.05 0.008 0.000  0.03  :   0.06
Non-EU citizen -0.08 0.014 0.000 -0.11  :  -0.06
Current smoker -0.01 0.010 0.237 -0.03  :   0.01
Cognitive reflection test  0.01 0.004 0.153 -0.00  :   0.01
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Figure 16: Concordance Indices for Statistical Questions
-41-
0 .25 .5 .75 1
Q8. Credit Risk in Frequency Format
Q7. Credit Risk in Probability Format
Q6. Breast Cancer Risk in Frequency Format
Q5. Breast Cancer Risk in Probability Format
Q4. Lifetime for Women
Q3. Lifetime for Men
Q2. Inflation
Q1. Compounding
Average of raw literacy rates given by index L and
SEU-implied literacy rates if average belief is used
Figure 17: Literacy Rates and Subjective Expected Utility
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Figure 19: Literacy and ROCL
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Appendix A: Experimental Instructions (NOT FOR PUBLICATION)
Text in square brackets is for the experimenter only.
A. General Instructions
Introduction
You are now participating in a decision-making experiment. Based on your decisions in this
experiment, you can earn money that will be paid to you in cash today. It is important that you
understand all instructions before making your choices in this experiment. 
Please turn to silent, and put away, your mobile phone, laptop computer, or any other device
you may have brought with you. Please do not talk with others seated nearby for the duration of the
experiment. If at any point you have a question, please raise your hand and we will answer you as soon
as possible. 
The experiment consists of a demographic survey and two decision-making tasks. You have
already earned £5 for agreeing to participate in the experiment, which will be paid in cash at the end of
the session. In addition to this show-up fee, you may earn considerably more from your choices in the
decision-making tasks. These tasks and the potential earnings from them will be explained in detail as
we proceed through the session. 
Before we begin the experiment, we will give you an informed consent form. This form
explains your rights as a participant in the experiment, what the experiment is about and how we make
payments to you. [Give the informed consent form to subjects and read it out loud.]
We will begin the experiment by asking you to answer some demographic questions. Your
answers to those questions will not influence your payoffs. [Give the questionnaire to subjects.]
We will now continue with the first decision-making task. You will be given written
instructions, but make all decisions on the computer in front of you. We will distribute the instructions
and then read it out loud. Please remain silent during the experiment, and simply raise your hand if
you have any question so that an experimenter will come to you.
   [Give the first set of instructions to subjects and read it out loud.]
   [Determine earnings for each subject.]
We will now continue with the second decision-making task. You will again be given written
instructions and make all decisions on the computer in front of you. We will distribute the instructions
and then read it out loud. Please remain silent during the experiment, and simply raise your hand if
you have any question so that an experimenter will come to you.
   [Give the second set of instructions to subjects and read it out loud.]
   [Determine earnings for each subject.]
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B. Belief Elicitation Instructions
Your Beliefs
This is a task where you will be paid according to how accurate your beliefs are about certain
things. You will be presented with 8 questions of the type we will explain below. You will actually get
the chance to play one question presented to you, so you should think carefully about your answer to
each question.
Here is an example of what the computer display of such a question might look like.
The display on your computer will be larger and easier to read. You have 10 sliders to adjust,
shown at the bottom of the screen, and you have 100 tokens to allocate. Each slider allows you to
allocate tokens to reflect your belief about the answer to this question. You must allocate all 100
tokens in order to submit your decision, and in this example we start with 10 tokens allocated to each
slider. The payoffs shown on the screen only apply when you allocate all 100 tokens. As you allocate
tokens, by adjusting sliders, the payoffs displayed on the screen will change. Your earnings are based
on the payoffs that are displayed after you have allocated all 100 tokens.
You can earn up to £20 in this task.
Where you position each slider depends on your beliefs about the correct answer to the
question. In the above example the tokens you allocate to each bar will naturally reflect your beliefs
about the official unemployment rate for all 16-64 years old in the UK as of August 1, 2012. The first
bar here corresponds to your belief that the unemployment rate is between 0% and 1.99%. The
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second bar corresponds to your belief that the unemployment rate is between 2% and 3.99%, and so
on. Each bar here shows the amount of money you earn if the official unemployment rate is in the
interval shown under the bar.
To illustrate how you use these sliders, suppose you think there is a fair chance the
unemployment rate is just under 5%. Then you might allocate the 100 tokens in the following way: 50
tokens to the interval 4% to 5.99%, 40 tokens to the interval 2% to 3.99%, and 10 tokens to the
interval 0% to 1.99%. So you can see in the picture below that if indeed the unemployment rate is
between 4% to 5.99% you would earn £15.80. You would then earn less than £15.80 for any other
outcome. You would earn £13.80 if the unemployment rate is between 2% and 3.99%, £7.80 if it is
between 0% and 1.99%, and for any other unemployment rate you would earn £5.80. 
 You can adjust the allocation as much as you want to best reflect your personal beliefs about
the unemployment rate.
Your earnings depend on your reported beliefs and, of course, the true answer. For instance,
suppose you allocated your tokens as in the figure shown above. The true unemployment is 7.8%. So
if you had reported the beliefs shown above, you would have earned £5.80.
Suppose you had put all of your eggs in one basket, and for example allocated 100 tokens to
the interval corresponding to 2.5%. Then you would have faced the earnings outcomes shown below.
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 Note the “good news” and “bad news” here. If the unemployment rate is indeed between 2%
and 3.99%, you earn the maximum payoff, shown here as £20. But the true unemployment rate is
7.8%, so you would have earned nothing in this task. 
It is up to you to balance the strength of your personal beliefs with the risk of them being
wrong. There are three important points for you to keep in mind when making your decisions:
    • Your belief about the correct answer to each question is a personal judgment that
depends on the information you have about the different events.  
    • Depending on your choices and the correct answer you can earn up to £20.
    • Your choices might also depend on your willingness to take risks or to gamble.  
 The decisions you make are a matter of personal choice. Please work silently, and make your
choices by thinking carefully about the questions you are presented with.
When you are happy with your decisions, you should click on the Submit button and confirm
your choices. When everyone is finished we will reveal the right answer to each of the 8 questions.
Then an experimenter will come to you and ask you to roll a 10-sided die until a number between 1
and 8 comes up to determine which question will be played out. The experimenter will record your
earnings according to the correct answer and the choices you made.
All payoffs are in cash, and are in addition to the £5 show-up fee that you receive just for
being here. 
Are there any questions?
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C. Risky Lotteries Task
Choices over Prospects
This is a task where you will choose between prospects with varying prizes and chances of
winning. You will be presented with 40 pairs of prospects. For each pair of prospects, you should
choose the prospect you prefer to play. You will actually get the chance to play one of the prospects
you choose, and you will be paid according to the outcome of that prospect, so you should think
carefully about which prospect you prefer.
Here is an example of what the computer display of such a pair of prospects might look like.
The outcome of the prospects will be determined by the draw of a random number between 1
and 100. Each number between, and including, 1 and 100 is equally likely to occur. In fact, you will be
able to draw the number yourself using two 10-sided dice.
In the above example the left prospect pays five pounds (£5) if the number drawn is between
1 and 40, and pays fifteen pounds (£15) if the number is between 41 and 100. The blue color in the
pie chart corresponds to 40% of the area and illustrates the chances that the number drawn will be
between 1 and 40 and your prize will be £5. The orange area in the pie chart corresponds to 60% of
the area and illustrates the chances that the number drawn will be between 41 and 100 and your prize
will be £15. 
Now look at the pie in the chart on the right. It pays five pounds (£5) if the number drawn is
between 1 and 50, ten pounds (£10) if the number is between 51 and 90, and fifteen pounds (£15) if
the number is between 91 and 100. As with the prospect on the left, the pie slices represent the
fraction of the possible numbers which yield each payoff. For example, the size of the £15 pie slice is
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10% of the total pie.
Each pair of prospects is shown on a separate screen on the computer. On each screen, you
should indicate which prospect you prefer to play by clicking on one of the buttons beneath the
prospects. 
You could also get a pair of prospects in which one of the prospects will give you the chance
to play “Double or Nothing.” For instance, the right prospect in the following screen image pays
“Double or Nothing” if the Green area is selected, which happens if the number drawn is between 51
and 100. The right pie chart indicates that if the number is between 1 and 50 you get £10. However, if
the number is between 51 and 100 a coin will be tossed to determine if you get double the amount. If
it comes up Heads you get £40, otherwise you get nothing. The prizes listed underneath each pie refer
to the amounts before any “Double or Nothing” coin toss.
After you have worked through all of the 40 pairs of prospects, raise your hand and an
experimenter will come over. You will then roll two 10-sided dice until a number between 1 and 40
comes up to determine which pair of prospects will be played out. Since there is a chance that any of
your 40 choices could be played out for real, you should approach each pair of prospects as if it is the
one that you will play out. Finally, you will roll the two ten-sided dice to determine the outcome of the
prospect you chose, and if necessary you will then toss a coin to determine if you get “Double or
Nothing.”
For instance, suppose you picked the prospect on the left in the last example. If the random
number was 37, you would win £0; if it was 93, you would get £20.
If you picked the prospect on the right and drew the number 37, you would get £10; if it was
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93, you would have to toss a coin to determine if you get “Double or Nothing.” If the coin comes up
Heads then you get £40. However, if it comes up Tails you get nothing from your chosen prospect.
It is also possible that you will be given a prospect in which there is a “Double or Nothing”
option no matter what the outcome of the random number. The screen image below illustrates this
possibility.
Therefore, your payoff is determined by four things:
• by which prospect you selected, the left or the right, for each of these 40 pairs;
• by which prospect pair is chosen to be played out in the series of 40 such pairs using the two
10-sided dice;
• by the outcome of that prospect when you roll the two 10-sided dice; and
• by the outcome of a coin toss if the chosen prospect outcome is of the “Double or Nothing”
type.
Which prospects you prefer is a matter of personal taste. The people next to you may be
presented with different prospects, and may have different preferences, so their responses should not
matter to you. Please work silently, and make your choices by thinking carefully about each prospect.
All payoffs are in cash, and are in addition to the £5 show-up fee that you receive just for being here. 
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D. Demographic and Other Hypothetical Questions
ID ______________
In this survey most of the questions asked are descriptive. We will not be grading your answers
and your responses are completely confidential. Please think carefully about each question and give
your best answers. 
   1. What is your age? ____________ years
   2. What is your sex? (Circle one number.)
   01 Male
   02 Female
   3. Which of the following categories best describes you?  (Circle one number.)
   01 White
   02 Mixed
   03 Asian or Asian British 
   04 Chinese or other ethnic group
   05 Prefer not to say
   4.  What is your main field of study? (Circle one number.)
   01 Accounting
   02 Economics
   03 Finance
   04 Business Administration, other than Accounting, Economics, or Finance
   05 Education
   06 Engineering
   07 Health and Medicine
   08 Biological and Biomedical Sciences
   09 Math, Computer Sciences, or Physical Sciences
   10 Social Sciences or History
   11 Law
   12 Psychology
   13 Modern Languages and Cultures
   14 Other Fields
   5.  What is your year of studies?  (Circle one number.)
   01 First year
   02 Second year
   03 Third year
   04 Masters
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   05 Doctoral
   6. What is the highest level of education you expect to complete? (Circle one number)
   01 Bachelor’s degree
   02 Master’s degree
   03 Doctoral degree
   04 Professional qualification
   7. As a percentage, what is your current average mark if you are doing a Bachelor’s degree, or
what was it when you did a Bachelor’s degree? This mark should refer to all your years of study for
this degree, not just the current year. Please pick one by rounding up or down to the nearest number:
   01 Above 70%
   02 Between 60 – 69%
   03 Between 50 – 59%
   04 Between 40 – 49%
   05 Less than 40%
   06 Have not taken courses for which grades are given.
   8. What is your citizenship status?
   01 British Citizen
   02 EU Citizen (non-British Citizen)
   03 Non-EU Citizen
   9. Are you currently:
   01 Single and never married?
   02 Married?
   03 Separated, divorced or widowed?
   10. How many people live in your household? Include yourself, your spouse and any dependents.
Do not include your parents or roommates unless you claim them as dependents. 
________ 
   11. Please circle the category below that describes the total amount of income before tax earned in
the calendar year 2007 by the people in your household (as “household” is defined in question 10). 
[Consider all forms of income, including salaries, tips, interest and dividend payments, scholarship
support, student loans, parental support, social security, alimony, and child support, and others.]
   01 Less than £10,000
   02 £10,000 – £19,999
   03 £20,000 – £29,999
   04 £30,000 – £49,999
   05 Over £50,000
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   12. Please circle the category below that describes the total amount of income before tax earned in
the calendar year 2007 by your parents.  [Consider all forms of income, including salaries, tips, interest
and dividend payments, social security, alimony, and child support, and others.] 
   01 Less than £10,000
   02 £10,000 – £19,999
   03 £20,000 – £29,999
   04 £30,000 – £49,999
   05 Over £50,000
   06 Don’t Know
   13. Do you currently smoke cigarettes? (Circle one number.)
   00 No
   01 Yes
   If yes, approximately how much do you smoke in one day? ________ cigarettes. 
   14. A bat and a ball cost £1.10 in total. The bat costs £1.00 more than the ball. How much does
the ball cost? £________
   15. If it takes 5 machines 5 minutes to make 5 widgets, how long would it take 100 machines to
make 100 widgets? ________ minutes
   16. In a lake, there is a patch of lily pads. Every day, the patch doubles in size. If it takes 48 days
for the patch to cover the entire lake, how long would it take for the patch to cover half of the lake?
________ days
   17. Imagine we are throwing a five-sided die 50 times. On average, out of these 50 throws how
many times would this five-sided die show an odd number (1, 3 or 5)? ________ out of 50 throws.
   18. Out of 1,000 people in a small town 500 are members of a choir. Out of these 500 members in
the choir 100 are men. Out of the 500 inhabitants that are not in the choir 300 are men. What is the
probability that a randomly drawn man is a member of the choir? (Please indicate the probability in
percent). ________%
   19. Imagine we are throwing a loaded die (6 sides). The probability that the die shows a 6 is twice
as high as the probability of each of the other numbers. On average, out of these 70 throws, how
many times would the die show the number 6? ________ out of 70 throws.
   20. In a forest 20% of mushrooms are red, 50% brown and 30% white. A red mushroom is
poisonous with a probability of 20%. A mushroom that is not red is poisonous with a probability of
5%. What is the probability that a poisonous mushroom in the forest is red? ________%
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E. Lottery Parameters 
Lottery parameters directly from Harrison, Martínez-Correa and Swarthout [2012]. For our experiments all prizes were divided by 4
and presented as British pounds.
Table A1: Simple Lotteries vs. Compound Lotteries (Pairs 1-15)
Compound Lottery
Simple Lottery Initial Lottery Initial Lottery
Final Prizes Probabilities Prizes Probabilities “Double or Nothing” EV EV
Pair Context Low Middle High Low Middle High Low Middle High Low Middle High option Simple Compound
1 1 $0 $10 $20 0.5 0.5 0 $0 $10 $20 0.5 0.5 0 DON if middle $5.00 $5.00
2 1 $0 $10 $20 0 1 0 $0 $10 $20 0.5 0.5 0 DON if middle $10.00 $5.00
3 2 $0 $10 $35 0 1 0 $0 $5 $17.50 0 0.5 0.5 DON for any outcome $10.00 $11.25
13 2 $0 $10 $35 0.25 0.75 0 $0 $17.50 $35 0.5 0.5 0 DON if middle $7.50 $8.75
4 3 $0 $10 $70 0.25 0.75 0 $0 $35 $70 0 1 0 DON for any outcome $7.50 $35.00
5 3 $0 $10 $70 0 1 0 $0 $35 $70 0 1 0 DON for any outcome $10.00 $35.00
6 4 $0 $20 $35 0 1 0 $0 $10 $35 0 0.5 0.5 DON if middle $20.00 $22.50
14 4 $0 $20 $35 0 0.75 0.25 $0 $17.50 $35 0 0.5 0.5 DON if middle $23.75 $8.75
7 5 $0 $20 $70 0 0.5 0.5 $0 $35 $70 0 0.5 0.5 DON if middle $45.00 $52.50
9 5 $0 $20 $70 0.5 0 0.5 $0 $20 $35 0 0.5 0.5 DON if high $35.00 $27.50
11 5 $0 $20 $70 0 1 0 $0 $20 $35 0 0.5 0.5 DON if high $20.00 $27.50
15 5 $0 $20 $70 0 0.75 0.25 $0 $35 $70 0 0.5 0.5 DON if middle $32.50 $52.50
8 6 $0 $35 $70 0 1 0 $0 $35 $70 0 0.5 0.5 DON if middle $35.00 $52.50
10 6 $0 $35 $70 0 0.75 0.25 $0 $35 $70 0 1 0 DON for any outcome $43.75 $35.00
12 6 $0 $35 $70 0 0.75 0.25 $0 $35 $70 0 0.5 0.5 DON if middle $43.75 $52.50
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Table A2: Simple Lotteries vs. Actuarially-Equivalent Lotteries (Pairs 16-30) 
Simple Lottery Actuarially-Equivalent EV EV
Final Prizes Probabilities Lottery Probabilities Simple Actuarially-
Pair Context Low Middle High Low Middle High Low Middle High Equivalent
16 1 $0 $10 $20 0.5 0.5 0 0.75 0 0.25 $5.00 $5.00
17 1 $0 $10 $20 0 1 0 0.75 0 0.25 $10.00 $5.00
18 2 $0 $10 $35 0 1 0 0.5 0.25 0.25 $10.00 $11.25
19 2 $0 $10 $35 0.25 0.75 0 0.75 0 0.25 $7.50 $8.75
20 3 $0 $10 $70 0.25 0.75 0 0.5 0 0.5 $7.50 $35.00
21 3 $0 $10 $70 0 1 0 0.5 0 0.5 $10.00 $35.00
22 4 $0 $20 $35 0 1 0 0.25 0.25 0.5 $20.00 $22.50
23 4 $0 $20 $35 0 0.75 0.25 0.25 0 0.75 $23.75 $8.75
24 5 $0 $20 $70 0 0.5 0.5 0.25 0 0.75 $45.00 $52.50
25 5 $0 $20 $70 0.5 0 0.5 0.25 0.5 0.25 $35.00 $27.50
26 5 $0 $20 $70 0 1 0 0.25 0.5 0.25 $20.00 $27.50
27 5 $0 $20 $70 0 0.75 0.25 0.25 0 0.75 $32.50 $52.50
28 6 $0 $35 $70 0 1 0 0.25 0 0.75 $35.00 $52.50
29 6 $0 $35 $70 0 0.75 0.25 0.5 0 0.5 $43.75 $35.00
30 6 $0 $35 $70 0 0.75 0.25 0.25 0 0.75 $43.75 $52.50
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Table A3: Actuarially-Equivalent Lotteries vs. Compound Lotteries (Pairs 31-40)
Compound Lottery
Actuarially-Equivalent Initial Lottery Initial Lottery EV EV
Final Prizes Lottery Probabilities Prizes Probabilities “Double or Nothing” Actuarially- Compound
Pair Context Low Middle High Low Middle High Low Middle High Low Middle High option Equivalent
1 1 $0 $10 $20 0.75 0 0.25 $0 $10 $20 0.5 0.5 0 DON if middle $5.00 $5.00
3 2 $0 $10 $35 0.5 0.25 0.25 $0 $5 $17.50 0 0.5 0.5 DON for any outcome $11.25 $11.25
13 2 $0 $10 $35 0.75 0 0.25 $0 $17.50 $35 0.5 0.5 0 DON if middle $8.75 $8.75
4 3 $0 $10 $70 0.5 0 0.5 $0 $35 $70 0 1 0 DON for any outcome $35.00 $35.00
6 4 $0 $20 $35 0.25 0.25 0.5 $0 $10 $35 0 0.5 0.5 DON if middle $22.50 $22.50
14 4 $0 $20 $35 0.25 0 0.75 $0 $17.50 $35 0 0.5 0.5 DON if middle $8.75 $8.75
7 5 $0 $20 $70 0.25 0 0.75 $0 $35 $70 0 0.5 0.5 DON if middle $52.50 $52.50
9 5 $0 $20 $70 0.25 0.5 0.25 $0 $20 $35 0 0.5 0.5 DON if high $27.50 $27.50
8 6 $0 $35 $70 0.25 0 0.75 $0 $35 $70 0 0.5 0.5 DON if middle $52.50 $52.50
10 6 $0 $35 $70 0.5 0 0.5 $0 $35 $70 0 1 0 DON for any outcome $35.00 $35.00
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Appendix B: Detailed Statistical Results (NOT FOR PUBLICATION)
Table B1: Estimates for Interest Compounding Question
(True response was £110.4)
             |               Robust
             |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
-------------+----------------------------------------------------------------
      female |   .1208637   .1390905     0.87   0.385    -.1517486     .393476
        ageS |   .3968186   .1936625     2.05   0.040      .017247    .7763901
      single |   .6368908   .4479348     1.42   0.155    -.2410453    1.514827
       white |   .2266173   .1577412     1.44   0.151    -.0825497    .5357843
     finance |   .1057089   .1583877     0.67   0.505    -.2047253     .416143
      non_eu |  -.0022251    .127354    -0.02   0.986    -.2518344    .2473843
      smoker |   -.315451   .3116881    -1.01   0.312    -.9263484    .2954465
        crtS |  -.0427266   .0771227    -0.55   0.580    -.1938843    .1084311
     berlinS |   .0508408   .0829787     0.61   0.540    -.1117944     .213476
       _cons |     109.71   .4570172   240.06   0.000     108.8142    110.6057
-------------+----------------------------------------------------------------
       sigma |   .9485433   .1233048                      .7352012    1.223793
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Table B2: Estimates for Inflation Question
(True response was £198)
             |               Robust
             |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
-------------+----------------------------------------------------------------
      female |   .6555166     .30101     2.18   0.029     .0655479    1.245485
        ageS |   -.049693   .2060632    -0.24   0.809    -.4535694    .3541834
      single |  -.0346816   .4901256    -0.07   0.944    -.9953101    .9259469
       white |  -.1477976   .4230715    -0.35   0.727    -.9770024    .6814072
     finance |  -.3338726   .2534093    -1.32   0.188    -.8305456    .1628005
      non_eu |  -.7831535   .4698084    -1.67   0.096    -1.703961    .1376539
      smoker |   -.095918   .3464372    -0.28   0.782    -.7749224    .5830864
        crtS |   .0795068   .1481538     0.54   0.592    -.2108692    .3698829
     berlinS |   .0675041   .1527122     0.44   0.658    -.2318064    .3668145
       _cons |   199.1655    .601727   330.99   0.000     197.9862    200.3449
-------------+----------------------------------------------------------------
       sigma |   1.696348   .1015747                      1.508504    1.907584
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
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Table B3: Estimates for Remaining Lifetime of Men Question
(True response was 59.1 years)
             |               Robust
             |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
-------------+----------------------------------------------------------------
      female |   2.262256   2.497932     0.91   0.365    -2.633602    7.158114
        ageS |   2.446757   2.312314     1.06   0.290    -2.085295    6.978809
      single |  -3.488838   7.019735    -0.50   0.619    -17.24727    10.26959
       white |   7.081467   3.446061     2.05   0.040     .3273123    13.83562
     finance |   3.842162   2.688428     1.43   0.153    -1.427061    9.111385
      non_eu |    1.31051   3.622383     0.36   0.718    -5.789229     8.41025
      smoker |    .396316   2.321885     0.17   0.864    -4.154495    4.947126
        crtS |  -.9155401   1.338364    -0.68   0.494    -3.538686    1.707606
     berlinS |   1.790858   1.455642     1.23   0.219    -1.062149    4.643865
       _cons |   48.28431   7.496065     6.44   0.000      33.5923    62.97633
-------------+----------------------------------------------------------------
       sigma |    15.8356   .8974917                      14.17073    17.69607
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Table B4: Estimates for Remaining Lifetime of Women Question
(True response was 62.9 years)
             |               Robust
             |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
-------------+----------------------------------------------------------------
      female |   .1826926   2.753928     0.07   0.947    -5.214907    5.580292
        ageS |   4.212811   1.999146     2.11   0.035     .2945579    8.131064
      single |   4.533479   5.629901     0.81   0.421    -6.500924    15.56788
       white |   4.043839   3.208968     1.26   0.208    -2.245623     10.3333
     finance |   2.796309   2.418511     1.16   0.248    -1.943885    7.536503
      non_eu |  -.0591597   3.629117    -0.02   0.987    -7.172098    7.053779
      smoker |   1.303762   2.747118     0.47   0.635     -4.08049    6.688014
        crtS |  -.3553245   1.254384    -0.28   0.777    -2.813871    2.103222
     berlinS |   .4161316    1.42578     0.29   0.770    -2.378345    3.210608
       _cons |   47.63064   7.041492     6.76   0.000     33.82957    61.43171
-------------+----------------------------------------------------------------
       sigma |   15.29233   .7719308                       13.8518    16.88265
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-62-
Table B5: Estimates for Breast Cancer with Probability Format
(True response was 7.8%)
             |               Robust
             |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
-------------+----------------------------------------------------------------
      female |  -2.932982   6.089349    -0.48   0.630    -14.86789    9.001922
        ageS |  -3.325164   4.301973    -0.77   0.440    -11.75688    5.106547
      single |  -3.255003   12.89618    -0.25   0.801    -28.53106    22.02105
       white |   19.23942   8.069034     2.38   0.017     3.424408    35.05444
     finance |  -13.33804   5.579889    -2.39   0.017    -24.27442   -2.401656
      non_eu |   14.90143    8.98151     1.66   0.097    -2.702003    32.50487
      smoker |   21.24842    8.23438     2.58   0.010     5.109333    37.38751
        crtS |   1.437001   3.130013     0.46   0.646    -4.697711    7.571714
     berlinS |  -6.916651   3.158586    -2.19   0.029    -13.10737   -.7259355
       _cons |    27.7921   15.25619     1.82   0.069    -2.109474    57.69367
-------------+----------------------------------------------------------------
       sigma |   31.42903   1.165036                      29.22658    33.79745
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Table B6: Estimates for Breast Cancer with Frequency Format
(True response was 7.8%)
             |               Robust
             |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
-------------+----------------------------------------------------------------
      female |    1.11684     6.0696     0.18   0.854    -10.77936    13.01304
        ageS |  -1.122605   4.138559    -0.27   0.786    -9.234031     6.98882
      single |  -.0654885   11.72954    -0.01   0.996    -23.05497    22.92399
       white |   8.896363   7.584211     1.17   0.241    -5.968417    23.76114
     finance |  -4.311176   5.455328    -0.79   0.429    -15.00342     6.38107
      non_eu |    2.06834   8.455557     0.24   0.807    -14.50425    18.64093
      smoker |   12.22554   8.624706     1.42   0.156    -4.678573    29.12965
        crtS |   .0828389   3.335038     0.02   0.980    -6.453715    6.619393
     berlinS |  -7.323202   3.126175    -2.34   0.019    -13.45039   -1.196011
       _cons |   24.38284   14.28641     1.71   0.088    -3.618005    52.38369
-------------+----------------------------------------------------------------
       sigma |     30.736   1.488787                      27.95226    33.79697
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
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Table B7: Estimates for Breast Cancer with Probability Format
When this Format was the First Question (N=58)
(True response was 7.8%)
             |               Robust
             |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
-------------+----------------------------------------------------------------
      female |   .8342124   9.343188     0.09   0.929     -17.4781    19.14652
        ageS |  -4.068261   7.706913    -0.53   0.598    -19.17353    11.03701
      single |  -8.673621   23.61839    -0.37   0.713    -54.96482    37.61758
       white |   23.82158   12.03242     1.98   0.048      .238464     47.4047
     finance |  -18.53848   8.124593    -2.28   0.023    -34.46239   -2.614568
      non_eu |   9.520125   13.93129     0.68   0.494     -17.7847    36.82495
      smoker |   23.90209   11.11602     2.15   0.032     2.115084     45.6891
        crtS |   5.531512   4.822146     1.15   0.251     -3.91972    14.98274
     berlinS |  -7.386577   4.161558    -1.77   0.076    -15.54308     .769927
       _cons |   34.36851    28.3536     1.21   0.225    -21.20353    89.94055
-------------+----------------------------------------------------------------
       sigma |   30.78217   1.849657                      27.36224    34.62954
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Table B8: Estimates for Breast Cancer with Frequency Format
When this Format was the First Question (N=62)
(True response was 7.8%)
             |               Robust
             |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
-------------+----------------------------------------------------------------
      female |   5.427551   7.564023     0.72   0.473    -9.397662    20.25276
        ageS |  -2.164721   5.068092    -0.43   0.669      -12.098    7.768556
      single |   3.165941   13.94157     0.23   0.820    -24.15903    30.49091
       white |   16.12129    10.1311     1.59   0.112    -3.735306    35.97788
     finance |  -5.563114   8.509187    -0.65   0.513    -22.24081    11.11458
      non_eu |   13.05352    10.7716     1.21   0.226    -8.058435    34.16547
      smoker |   8.322137   11.58149     0.72   0.472    -14.37716    31.02143
        crtS |   -5.62591    3.86677    -1.45   0.146    -13.20464     1.95282
     berlinS |   -4.30888   4.130409    -1.04   0.297    -12.40433    3.786573
       _cons |   7.952285   15.99824     0.50   0.619    -23.40368    39.30825
-------------+----------------------------------------------------------------
       sigma |    29.5268   2.181793                      25.54579    34.12819
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
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Table B9: Estimates for Credit Risk with Probability Format
(True response was 66.7%)
             |               Robust
             |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
-------------+----------------------------------------------------------------
      female |  -12.33833   5.135729    -2.40   0.016    -22.40417   -2.272485
        ageS |    4.46227   3.943151     1.13   0.258    -3.266165     12.1907
      single |   10.43192   10.37032     1.01   0.314    -9.893539    30.75737
       white |  -.5145085   8.351986    -0.06   0.951     -16.8841    15.85508
     finance |  -6.019441   4.601255    -1.31   0.191    -15.03773    2.998853
      non_eu |  -3.495325   8.554781    -0.41   0.683    -20.26239    13.27174
      smoker |   3.003925   6.618789     0.45   0.650    -9.968663    15.97651
        crtS |  -.0903645   2.920145    -0.03   0.975    -5.813744    5.633015
     berlinS |    3.56716   2.938142     1.21   0.225    -2.191493    9.325812
       _cons |   61.81362   13.28393     4.65   0.000     35.77761    87.84964
-------------+----------------------------------------------------------------
       sigma |   26.77588   1.207207                      24.51133    29.24965
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Table B10: Estimates for Credit Risk with Frequency Format
(True response was 66.7%)
             |               Robust
             |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
-------------+----------------------------------------------------------------
      female |  -7.799498   5.662294    -1.38   0.168    -18.89739    3.298395
        ageS |   5.214897   3.378843     1.54   0.123    -1.407513    11.83731
      single |   20.18916   9.327712     2.16   0.030     1.907185    38.47114
       white |   12.51622   8.802366     1.42   0.155    -4.736099    29.76854
     finance |  -2.562685   4.959702    -0.52   0.605    -12.28352    7.158153
      non_eu |   18.62015   9.214859     2.02   0.043     .5593618    36.68095
      smoker |   .2132735   7.126544     0.03   0.976     -13.7545    14.18104
        crtS |    .974174   2.796107     0.35   0.728    -4.506094    6.454442
     berlinS |   5.769675   2.692328     2.14   0.032     .4928082    11.04654
       _cons |   28.06668   13.17115     2.13   0.033     2.251706    53.88165
-------------+----------------------------------------------------------------
       sigma |   27.13271   1.296473                      24.70703    29.79654
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
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Table B11: Estimates for Credit Risk with Probability Format
When this Format was the First Question (N=62)
(True response was 66.7%)
             |               Robust
             |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
-------------+----------------------------------------------------------------
      female |  -10.12084   7.174753    -1.41   0.158     -24.1831    3.941413
        ageS |   8.998826   3.891018     2.31   0.021     1.372572    16.62508
      single |   26.74031   9.910682     2.70   0.007     7.315727    46.16489
       white |   10.23155   8.743735     1.17   0.242    -6.905859    27.36895
     finance |  -7.732764   6.944066    -1.11   0.265    -21.34288    5.877355
      non_eu |   2.997623   9.175632     0.33   0.744    -14.98629    20.98153
      smoker |   4.390203   6.917286     0.63   0.526    -9.167428    17.94783
        crtS |  -4.006747   3.657293    -1.10   0.273    -11.17491    3.161416
     berlinS |   11.29258   2.940537     3.84   0.000      5.52923    17.05592
       _cons |   34.54933   14.27547     2.42   0.016     6.569911    62.52874
-------------+----------------------------------------------------------------
       sigma |   25.57656   1.413615                      22.95072    28.50283
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Table B12: Estimates for Credit Risk with Frequency Format
When this Format was the First Question (N=62)
(True response was 66.7%)
             |               Robust
             |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
-------------+----------------------------------------------------------------
      female |   -1.50905   8.081353    -0.19   0.852    -17.34821    14.33011
        ageS |   9.666001   4.593329     2.10   0.035     .6632411    18.66876
      single |   22.37095   15.45922     1.45   0.148    -7.928573    52.67047
       white |   8.429374   16.17703     0.52   0.602    -23.27702    40.13577
     finance |  -1.227179   7.491029    -0.16   0.870    -15.90933    13.45497
      non_eu |   7.642467   17.16264     0.45   0.656    -25.99569    41.28062
      smoker |   -.909114   14.00157    -0.06   0.948    -28.35168    26.53345
        crtS |   2.046534   4.300484     0.48   0.634    -6.382259    10.47533
     berlinS |   4.751404   4.278632     1.11   0.267    -3.634561    13.13737
       _cons |   29.81129    21.9804     1.36   0.175    -13.26949    72.89208
-------------+----------------------------------------------------------------
       sigma |   27.72974    1.81675                      24.38812    31.52923
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
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Table B13: Estimates for Breast Cancer Risk with Both Formats
               |               Robust
               |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
---------------+----------------------------------------------------------------
     frequency |  -8.780653   2.622727    -3.35   0.001     -13.9211   -3.640202
breast_F_first |  -1.880165   5.001399    -0.38   0.707    -11.68273    7.922396
        female |  -.8176635   5.257625    -0.16   0.876    -11.12242    9.487092
          ageS |  -1.958312   3.738468    -0.52   0.600    -9.285575    5.368951
        single |  -1.349017   10.54452    -0.13   0.898     -22.0159    19.31787
         white |   14.54114   5.662997     2.57   0.010     3.441867    25.64041
       finance |  -8.783428   4.979758    -1.76   0.078    -18.54357    .9767177
        non_eu |   8.731927   6.837669     1.28   0.202    -4.669657    22.13351
        smoker |   16.56504   7.027368     2.36   0.018     2.791648    30.33843
          crtS |   .7693924   2.857754     0.27   0.788    -4.831702    6.370486
       berlinS |  -7.244087   2.870351    -2.52   0.012    -12.86987   -1.618302
         _cons |   30.79826   12.71119     2.42   0.015     5.884786    55.71173
---------------+----------------------------------------------------------------
         sigma |   31.26975   1.176413                      29.04698    33.66262
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Table B14: Estimates for Breast Cancer Risk with Both Formats
When the Frequency Format was the Second Question (N=58)
             |               Robust
             |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
-------------+----------------------------------------------------------------
   frequency |  -7.906759   3.865179    -2.05   0.041    -15.48237    -.331147
      female |  -.5126137   8.652634    -0.06   0.953    -17.47146    16.44624
        ageS |  -.0453931   6.898456    -0.01   0.995    -13.56612    13.47533
      single |  -1.241718    21.8429    -0.06   0.955    -44.05301    41.56957
       white |   13.45107   10.82962     1.24   0.214    -7.774593    34.67674
     finance |  -12.97861   6.627994    -1.96   0.050    -25.96924    .0120169
      non_eu |   1.854472   11.93734     0.16   0.877    -21.54228    25.25122
      smoker |   16.85493   10.75168     1.57   0.117    -4.217971    37.92782
        crtS |   6.294715   4.243566     1.48   0.138    -2.022523    14.61195
     berlinS |  -8.572086   3.629374    -2.36   0.018    -15.68553   -1.458644
       _cons |   37.24837   26.07599     1.43   0.153    -13.85964    88.35638
-------------+----------------------------------------------------------------
       sigma |   31.09647   1.710031                      27.91917    34.63536
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
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Table B15: Estimates for Credit Risk with Both Formats
               |               Robust
               |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
---------------+----------------------------------------------------------------
     frequency |  -1.093302   2.457748    -0.44   0.656    -5.910399    3.723795
credit_F_first |   3.262956   4.167427     0.78   0.434     -4.90505    11.43096
        female |  -9.885857   4.318312    -2.29   0.022    -18.34959    -1.42212
          ageS |   4.543536   2.863814     1.59   0.113    -1.069436    10.15651
        single |   15.09596   6.717241     2.25   0.025     1.930411    28.26151
         white |   6.205505   7.602942     0.82   0.414    -8.695988      21.107
       finance |  -4.698919   4.093765    -1.15   0.251    -12.72255    3.324713
        non_eu |   7.952487   7.896865     1.01   0.314    -7.525083    23.43006
        smoker |   2.008373   5.896095     0.34   0.733    -9.547762    13.56451
          crtS |   .2163768   2.468343     0.09   0.930    -4.621486    5.054239
       berlinS |   4.603194    2.10187     2.19   0.029     .4836052    8.722783
         _cons |   43.59671   11.69502     3.73   0.000     20.67488    66.51854
---------------+----------------------------------------------------------------
         sigma |   27.23843   1.107556                      25.15191    29.49805
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Table B16: Estimates for Credit Risk with Both Formats
When the Frequency Format was the Second Question (N=62)
             |               Robust
             |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
-------------+----------------------------------------------------------------
   frequency |    3.51211   3.540208     0.99   0.321    -3.426569    10.45079
      female |  -11.10497   5.873301    -1.89   0.059    -22.61643    .4064855
        ageS |   4.224511   3.454046     1.22   0.221    -2.545295    10.99432
      single |   22.86012    6.34174     3.60   0.000     10.43053     35.2897
       white |   15.25103   8.144386     1.87   0.061    -.7116762    31.21373
     finance |  -5.099743   5.762526    -0.88   0.376    -16.39409      6.1946
      non_eu |   18.05947   9.300997     1.94   0.052    -.1701477    36.28909
      smoker |   2.293681   5.355934     0.43   0.668    -8.203757    12.79112
        crtS |  -1.434976   3.189159    -0.45   0.653    -7.685613     4.81566
     berlinS |   8.230033   2.312235     3.56   0.000     3.698136    12.76193
       _cons |    25.1368   12.61047     1.99   0.046      .420728    49.85287
-------------+----------------------------------------------------------------
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Estimates obtained for 114 out of 120 subjects.
Figure B1: Distribution of RRA
Based on Individual Model of Behavior
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